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 Sharing once hidden information:
Credit bureaus, MFIs, and client
welfare
For at least 30 years, the microﬁnance
movement sought to provide credit in settings
where strong constraints meant traditional
banking methods weren’t feasible.
One particular constraint to traditional banking methods was
the high fixed cost of information gathering, storage and
dissemination. Over time, this constraint has been relaxed as
microfinance institutions (MFIs) have expanded in scale,
information technology has decreased in cost and client incomes
have risen. This has led to the development of a group lending
model leveraging information held by peers: credit bureaus.
Sharing hidden information
It is now possible to effectively gather and store clients’
borrowing records and personal details in a credit bureau
accessible by all MFIs. Should this new possibility be embraced,
and if so, how should it be applied?
The answer is not obvious and depends greatly on the extent of
hidden information regarding the probability of borrowers
repaying their loan, as well as moral hazard. This involves
adverse selection of borrowers by MFI’s due to asymmetric
information on the borrower risk type. This in turn leads to risk
after the financial transaction.
MFI competition
Another concern is how MFIs compete with each other. To
expand, in the presence of adverse selection and without a
credit bureau (in charge of gathering account information from
various creditors for consumer reporting agencies), a single MFI
is effectively a monopoly lender to any client that has a proven
track record of loan repayment. This has a negative effect,
because good clients end up paying more due to a lack of
competition. But over time, profits earned from high quality
borrowers mean MFIs have an incentive to learn whether a
client is a good prospect by offering small loans and observing
payment over time.
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Credit scores and client welfare
The introduction of a credit bureau likely weakens both the
positive and negative impacts as the overall implications for
welfare depend on the extent of hidden information, and the
strength of competition in the market. This issue will be
familiar to many of us. Bank reliance on credit scores in
developed countries makes it easy to move banks for those of us
with good credit scores, however it can equally serve as a
barrier for young people to get on the credit ladder.
With moral hazard there are similar opposing effects. On the
positive side, information sharing between banks means that
default can be punished more effectively (clients who default
will likely be barred from all lending, rather than being able to
start again at a different MFI). This will potentially allow for
credit expansion, a win for both clients and lenders.
On the negative side, some borrowers will default through no
fault of their own and an efficient lending system would allow
for some kind of rehabilitation. This may not be possible with a
credit bureau if all lenders apply strict standards. Again, the
impacts on client’s welfare will be determined by how firms use
the information in the bureau, and the extent of moral hazard.
Credit bureaus: a Pakistan case study
Pakistan has recently launched a microfinance credit bureau,
providing the perfect opportunity to understand their positive
and negative impacts as well as their influence on credit prices
and access.
MFI branches across Pakistan are clustered into different
“markets” of competing branches. Each market is then assigned
to one of two randomly selected treatments: for some markets,
all firms will have access to the bureau as soon as possible. In
other markets, access will be delayed.
Together with the Pakistan Microfinance Network, this design
has been implemented by sequencing the training of MFI staff
on the new system. Using administrative data from the bureau
itself, how lending and borrowing behavior is affected by the
roll out of credit bureaus will be tracked. The study will provide
insight into how the bureau affects access to credit and the price
of credit. It will also expose how variations in take-up, changes
the impact of the bureau.
